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Abstract
Current models of conservation auctions do not permit for the presence of environ-
mental externalities and synergies between bidders. Yet, conservation auctions are
usually set up for the very purpose of addressing problems associated with envi-
ronmental externalities. Clearly, our models do not tell the whole story, and they
consequently fail to identify waste and ineﬃciency in these auctions. This paper
shows how externalities between bidders can be incorporated into our models of
conservation auctions, and uses this framework to investigate the cost-eﬃciency of
the uniform-price auction when neighbours can bid jointly. Allowing neighbours to
bid jointly allows them to internalise these externalities, but also reduces the com-
petitiveness of the auction. The net eﬀect on cost-eﬃciency is ambiguous, so we
show how simulation can be used to determine in what circumstances joint bidding
can be expected to reduce the payments needed to secure a given amount of ecosys-
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1 Introduction
Billions of dollars in payments for ecosystem services (PES) are allocated through auc-
tions every year. PES schemes like the Conservation Reserve Program in the US, the
Bush Tender in Australia, and the Country Stewardship Scheme in the UK all make use
of auctions (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005).
Such schemes are set up to encourage activities that produce more (less) positive
(negative) environmental externalities, and thus deliver ecosystem services. Because
bidders in these auctions are usually engaged in environmentally sensitive production,
chiefly agriculture, and are located in relatively cohesive geographical areas, it is diﬃcult
to imagine that the conservation measures taken would not also have external eﬀects on
others bidding in the same auction. There may be site synergies (also referred to as co-
benefits and agglomeration benefits), such that there are added conservation benefits if
neighbouring parcels of land commit to some conservation measure (Banerjee et al., 2009;
Sa¨ıd and Thoyer, 2007). There may be cost synergies, which arise if there are decreasing
marginal costs of conservation, so that the cost of committing to some conservation
measure is lower if neighbours also agree to conserve. But even if neither of these
are relevant, the environmental externalities for which the scheme is set up, and other
externalities associated with the same activities, are by construction an important part
of PES schemes.
Yet, our models of conservation auctions begin by assuming that there are no such
externalities between bidders. They assume that individuals have independent valu-
ations of winning.1 Thus, on the one hand, we are setting up auctions to correct for
environmental externalities, and, on the other hand, relying on models that assume there
are no such externalities to design and evaluate these auctions. This is clearly not an
ideal situation. In the presence of externalities, your neighbours’ valuations of winning
conservation contracts will, in part, depend on whether or not you win a conservation
1A standard reference is Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort (1997).
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contract. Valuations are, in a word, interdependent.
If bidders fail to internalise externalities, the auctioneer may end up making exces-
sively large payments to secure a given amount of ecosystem services. If neighbours are
permitted to submit bids jointly, they will internalise the externalities, but this comes
at the expense of competitive pressure in the auction, again resulting in excessive pay-
ments. Because current models assume there are no externalities, they fail to identify
such waste and ineﬃciency.
Several reports have asked whether conservation auctions should use individual or
joint bidding. Chan et al. (2003), writing for the Australian Productivity Commission,
devote a section to the “possibility of joint bidding”, but are forced to conclude that
analysis of joint bidding is virtually absent from the literature. In a report to the Scottish
Executive Environment and Rural Aﬀairs Department, Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi
(2005) echo this conclusion, writing that “the eﬃciency and payment properties of joint
bidding are barely explored in the literature and detailed auction rules are yet to be
developed” (p. 31). This paper attempts to fill this gap. It is important to emphasize
that, while current models do not consider externalities and joint bidding, joint bidding
may well already be going on in individual and joint bidding situations alike. Some of
the cost-eﬃciency gains sometimes associated with joint bidding maybe is already being
captured in practice. However, analysts are clearly lacking a framework that allows them
to identify these gains. By introducing and reinterpreting some important results from
auction theory in the context of PES auctions, the present study hopes to enable such
analysis. Gaining control of this design dimension—individual or joint bidding—may
then help policy makers implement more cost-eﬃcient auctions.
Section 2 introduces a general framework that allows us to incorporate externalities
between bidders into models of conservation auctions. Building on this framework, sec-
tion 3 explores the properties of the uniform-price auction—one of the most commonly
used conservation auction formats—with individual and joint bidding. The main conclu-
3
sion is that joint bidding is more cost-eﬃcient when externalities are ‘suﬃciently large’.
We show, by means of a simple simulated example, how the policy maker can determine
precisely what ‘suﬃciently large’ means for a particular PES scheme, and hence which
bidding structure would be more cost-eﬃcient. Section 4 concludes.
2 A ‘Neighbourhood World’
Imagine farmers dumping their waste into a river. All the farmers aﬀect the water qual-
ity in the town located downstream, but the upstream farmers will also aﬀect water
quality for the downstream farmers, who use the river for irrigation. Figure 1 draws an
illustrative map, where some farmers aﬀect their nearest downstream neighbour. Each
farmer is represented by a vertex, and each edge indicates the presence of externalities
between a pair of farmers. The assumption of independent valuations corresponds vi-
sually to farmers just being isolated dots on a plane. Introducing externalities into the
analysis of conservation auctions corresponds to introducing edges into the graph.
! !
Figure 1: An illustrative map
Each farmer i (where i = 1, . . . , I) chooses his own production activities. Uncon-
strained in his choice, i’s profit is πi. The PES scheme is in place to encourage him to
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take some conservation measure yi. The conservation measure could be something like
reducing the use of a pesticide, a fertiliser, or setting aside land for some alternate use.
If i is awarded a conservation contract, he commits to doing yi, which is associated with
the lower profit πi￿ (i.e. conservation is costly). i’s individual valuation of this event,
not counting the payment he receives, is vi = πi￿ − πi ≤ 0.
However, because i produces an externality if he conserves, his individual valuation
will diﬀer from his neighbourhood’s valuation of this event. To see this, let us consider
formally what we mean by a ‘neighbourhood’. A neighbourhood, denoted n (where
n = 1, . . . , N), is a disjoint complete subgraph, meaning that if i ∈ n, then i /∈ m for
all m ￿= n, and that if i, j ∈ n, then i and j are connected by an edge (i.e. they are
‘neighbours’). Each neighbourhood has L members. Taking the twelve farmers in figure
1 as an example, figure 2 draws illustrative graphs for diﬀerent neighbourhood config-
urations, where neighbourhood size L varies between 2 and 4. We obtain a complete
graph when L = I.2 When L = 1, we have a totally disjoint graph, which corresponds
to the traditional assumption of independent valuations. We call the world of L ≥ 2 the
‘neighbourhood world’, to contrast it with the ‘neighbour-less world’ of independence.
Each edge connects two neighbours, i and j, and signifies that i’s production choices
aﬀect j, and/or vice versa. For conservation measures yi and yj , an edge is associated
with two externality flows, eij and eji. When i wins a conservation contract, he alters his
production such that he produces an externality eij that impacts j’s payoﬀ. Conversely,
eji is the externality produced by j and experienced by i. Naturally, we permit eij ￿= eji,
because i’s actions may have a diﬀerent eﬀect on j’s payoﬀ than the converse, as we would
expect in our above example with upstream and downstream farmers. This asymmetry
also allows us to consider synergies, which we could represent by letting the externality
be zero for the first neighbour to win, but positive for subsequent neighbours.
2Notice that every possible graph with I vertices is nested in the complete graph obtained for L = I,
and can be obtained simply by letting some edges be associated with externalities of zero magnitude.
Thus, this basic structure permits analysis of any graph the researcher may find of interest.
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I = 12, N = 6, L = 2 I = 12, N = 3, L = 4
Larger neighbourhoods
I = 12, N = 4, L = 3
Figure 2: Graphs of the ‘neighbourhood world’
We follow the convention of modeling this as an additive externality, such that i’s
payoﬀ is πi+ eji if πi is i’s profit and only individual j from among his neighbours wins
a contract (Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996; das Varma, 2002). This implies no loss of
generality, since it is possible to let the size of j’s impact on i depend also on the scale
of i’s production, such that eji(yj ,πi,πi￿).
The simplest ‘neighbourhood world’ will suﬃce to illustrate the eﬀects of introducing
externalities into the analysis. Therefore, we shall henceforth focus our attention on the
case where L = 2 (as in figure 1 and the leftmost panel of figure 2). In this case, we can
drop the double superscript for externalities, so that eij = ei and eji = ej .
Without any conservation contracts, as is the status quo, n’s neighbourhood payoﬀ
is πn = πi + πj . If only i is awarded a contract, the neighbourhood payoﬀ is πin =
πi￿ + πj + ei, not including any payment received. The neighbourhood valuation of this
event is therefore vin = πin − πn = vi + ei. Table 1 completes this notation.
We impose the restriction that vin, vjn ≤ 0, which simply says that conservation com-
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Table 1: Neighbourhood Payoﬀs and Valuations
Outcome Payoﬀ Valuation
i and j lose πn = πi + πj 0
i wins, j loses πin = πi￿ + πj + ei vin = vi + ei
j wins, i loses πjn = πi + πj￿ + ej vjn = vj + ej
i and j win π2n = πi￿ + πj￿ + ei + ei v2n = vi + vj + ei + ej
mitments are costly, so they would not be undertaken voluntarily even when accounting
for intra-neighbourhood externalities. Alternatively, one can think of it as excluding
from the auction those who would conserve voluntarily.
For expositional convenience, let us define vn1 = max(vin, vjn) and vn2 = min(vin, vjn),
which are simply the first and second order statistics of neighbourhood n’s valuations.3
We shall refer to vn1 as n’s valuation of winning the ‘first’ contract, and vn2 as its valuation
of winning a ‘second’ contract. Let πn1 and πn2 denote the payoﬀs associated with winning
the first and second contract respectively.
Individual valuations ignore externalities, while neighbourhood valuations take them
into account. In the next section, we use this representational framework to model and
simulate the uniform-price auction in the ‘neighbourhood world’.
3 The Uniform-Price Auction in a ‘Neighbourhood World’
The framework introduced in the previous section allows us to incorporate externalities
between bidders into models of conservation auctions. In this section, we illustrate the
3If the size of externalities depends on scale of production, then
ei(yi,πj ,πj￿) =

αi(yi,πj) if vi + αi(yi,πj) > vj + αj(yi,πi)
βi(yi,πj￿) otherwise
must satisfy vi + αi(yi,πj) > vj + βj(yj ,πi￿) whenever vi + βi(yi,πj￿) > vj + αj(yj ,πi). Otherwise, we
have both vin > vjn and vin < vjn. This makes it very diﬃcult to make any reasonable a priori guess
about which neighbour in n will submit the highest bid (although we can analyse both possibilities),
unless we have more information about the bargaining problem. Of course, the neighbourhood may be
fully able to resolve the question whether or not we know enough to predict the outcome.
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use of this framework by analysing the properties of the uniform-price sealed bid auction
in the ‘neighbourhood world’. To highlight the relevance to practical policy decisions, we
specifically address the question of whether the policy maker should opt for an individual
or joint bidding structure. Which bidding regime results in the policy maker having to
make lower expected payments to achieve his conservation target?
We can think of the policy maker’s problem as figuring out what action he should
take in the first stage of a three-stage game. First, he chooses whether individuals should
be forced to bid individually, or whether they should be allowed to form bidding coali-
tions with their neighbours. Second, coalitions are formed, as permitted, and individu-
als/neighbourhoods formulate their optimal bidding strategies. Third, bids are submit-
ted, and contracts and payments are awarded according to the rules of the uniform-price
sealed bid auction. As a policy maker, we are interested in what our choice in the first
stage should be: individual or joint bidding? Solving by backward induction, let us
describe these three stages in reverse order. We continue to focus on the case where
L = 2, for expositional ease.
Stage 3: The Auction
There are K < I identical and indivisible conservation contracts for sale. Each contract
mandates a conservation measure i must take if he is awarded the contract, for each
i. Let the vector of conservation measures be denoted simply by y. Given y, individ-
ual valuations and externalities are independent realisations of two random variables
with known distributions with full support on the intervals [ν, ν] and [e, e], respectively.
Individual variation in valuations and externalities can be thought to result from in-
dividual diﬀerences in production technologies, location, and the potentially diﬀerent
conservation measures they would need to undertake.4 Neighbourhood valuations are
4In practice, of course, a particular individual will be associated with a given production technology
and located in a particular environmental context, so that his individual valuation and externality is
completely determined. However, the policy maker’s problem is one of asymmetric information, and
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then independent realisations of the sum vi + ei, which, given y, has a distribution G
with full support on [v, v]. Our earlier assumption that conservation is costly, even for
neighbourhoods, implies that v ≤ 0.
In the individual bidding scenario, individual i submits a sealed bid bi, which specifies
what he is prepared to pay to commit to taking conservation measure yi. An individual
bids only for one contract. In the joint bidding scenario, each neighbourhood submits
a sealed bid profile bn = (bn1 , bn2 ), which specifies what it is prepared to pay to commit
to the conservation measure specified for each additional contract it may win. Because
conservation is costly, bids are negative.5
Following Krishna (2002), let us construct a K-vector of competing bids facing indi-
vidual i, c−i = (c−i1 , . . . , c
−i
K ), by arranging the bids submitted by all other individuals
in descending order and selecting the first K of these. c−ik is the kth order statistic of
bids not submitted by i (where k = 1, . . . ,K). If individual i bids alone, submitting a
bid bi, then
i wins κ =
 1 contract if b
i > c−iK
0 contracts otherwise
and receives a payment of (−p) if he wins, where p is the value of the highest rejected
bid, given by
p =
 c
−i
K if b
i > c−iK
max(bi, c−iK+1) otherwise
Suppose individual i forms a coalition with his neighbour j. We can construct c−n for
neighbourhood n in the same way as before. n now submits a bid profile bn = (bn1 , bn2 ),
this set up allows us to analyse the problem when we only know about the distributions of individual
valuations and externalities in the population.
5This set up describes an auction where conservation measures are fixed and bidders compete in prices,
and we do not consider the auctioneer as having any budget constraint. By changing the the fixed and
random variables, however, the model can be adapted to consider a situation where the prices are fixed
and bidders compete in conservation measures. In that model, the auctioneer’s budget constraint could
be trivially satisfied.
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and
n wins κ =

2 contracts if bn2 > c
−n
K−1
1 contract if bn1 > c
−n
K and b
n
2 < c
−n
K−1
0 contracts otherwise
and all winners are awarded the same per contract payment (−p), were p is given by
p =

c−nK−1 if b
n
2 > c
−n
K−1
max(bn2 , c
−n
K ) if b
n
1 > c
−n
K and b
n
2 < c
−n
K−1
max(bn1 , cnK+1) otherwise
A neighbourhood or individual winning κ contracts thus receives a total payment
of κ × (−p). The uniform-price auction can be straightforwardly extended to bidding
coalitions of any size (Krishna, 2002). The total cost to the auctioneer of achieving the
conservation target is K × (−p).
Stage 2: Coalition Formation and Optimal Bidding Strategies
How coalitions are formed, and hence, what coalitions end up bidding in the auction,
will aﬀect optimal bidding strategies and the outcome of the auction. This is a point
of particular interest, because this is really where the outcome of the auction is being
determined. The standard models used to describe PES auctions consider only the
possibility that all participants are bidding individually. The polar opposite would be
if each neighbourhood maximised the joint expected payoﬀ of all of its neighbours. For
simplicity, our analysis will contrast these two scenarios. We shall simply assume that,
if coalitions are prohibited, every individual bids to maximise his individual expected
payoﬀ. This is the individual bidding scenario normally modeled, and therefore serves
as an interesting benchmark. In the presence of externalities, even this benchmark
is ineﬃcient. If coalitions are permitted, we assume that every neighbourhood forms a
separate coalition, becomes aware of externalities, and bids to maximise its joint expected
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payoﬀ.6 Although neighbourhoods cooperate in our model by assumption, there does
exist a set of potential side payments that could sustain neighbourhood cooperation (this
is indicated by the fact that, as we shall see momentarily, the optimal individual and
joint bidding strategies diﬀer). Restricting our attention to these two scenarios will serve
to illustrate the impact of introducing externalities and joint bidding into our models of
PES auctions.
Individual bidding strategy
There are I bidders in the individual bidding scenario, each bidding for a single contract.
Individual i formulates his bid based on his individual valuation, as privately optimising
behaviour dictates. In this scenario, the uniform-price auction is strategically equivalent
to the Vickrey auction, which means that it will be a weakly dominant strategy for each
bidder to submit a bid equal to his individual valuation. In equilibrium, therefore, each
bidder i submits a bid bi = vi.7
Joint bidding strategy
There are N bidders in the joint bidding scenario, each submitting two bids, one for
each neighbour. Individuals still select production individually, but they now formulate
a joint bidding strategy based on neighbourhood valuations. Thus, externalities still
exist in the joint bidding scenario, but individuals are now able to use the joint bidding
mechanism to account for their presence.8
6In practice, PES auctions are likely to occur somewhere along the intermediate range between our
individual and joint bidding schenarios. The choice of a individual or joint bidding regime is probably
more akin to pushing us in one direction or another along this range, and bidding strategies and auction
outcomes will depend in very complicated ways on this choice within this range. The question of coalition
formation is very interesting and highly pertinent, and should prove a fruitful area for experimental
examination.
7See Krishna (2002) for a proof.
8If neighbours merged their production activities, neighbourhoods could be treated as ‘individuals’,
and there would be no externalities to start with. Notice that if we tried to achieve this artificially by
designing the auction so that each neighbourhood could submit only a single bid covering the conservation
activities of the entire neighbourhood, we would be forced to either award contracts to every member
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We define the joint bidding strategy as a functionBn(vn1 , vn2 ) = (Bn1 (vn1 , vn2 ), Bn2 (vn1 , vn2 )) :
[v, 0]2 → R2−− returning two bids from two valuations. For easy comparison, the optimal
individual bidding strategy could be written as the identity function, Bi(vi) = vi.
Define Fk(x)|B as the probability that, if all neighbourhoods except n use bidding
strategy B, at least k bids made by those neighbourhoods are less than or equal to x. In
a symmetric equilibrium all bidders pursue the same bidding strategy B∗. Let us then
write Fk(x)|B∗ = F ∗k (x), to simplify notation, and f∗k (x) as the corresponding density.
Then, n’s expected payoﬀ is
E(πn) =
￿ bn2
v
(π2n − 2c−nK−1)f∗K−1(c−nK−1)dc−nK−1 +
￿ bn1
bn2
(πn1 − c−nK )f∗K(c−nK )dc−nK
+(πn1 − bn2 )(F ∗K(bn2 )− F ∗K−1(bn2 )) + (πn)(1− F ∗K(bn1 )) (1)
The first term is n’s payoﬀ from winning two contracts, weighted by the probability of
that event. The second term is the probability-weighted payoﬀ from winning a single
contract and paying cnK , the third is for winning a single contract but paying b
n
2 , and
the final term is for the event of not winning any contracts at all. The expected payoﬀ
is maximised with respect to bn1 when
bn1 = π
n
1 − πn = vn1 (2)
The second equality is obtained from the definitions in section 2. Thus, in equilibrium,
each neighbourhood’s first bid will equal its neighbourhood valuation of the first contract,
B∗1(vn1 ) = vn1 . This looks similar to the individual bidding scenario, except that it now
accounts for externalities. The expected payoﬀ is maximised with respect to bn2 when
bn2 = (π
2n − πn1 )−
F ∗K(b
n
2 )− F ∗K−1(bn2 )
f∗K(b
n
2 )
= vn2 −
F ∗K(b
n
2 )− F ∗K−1(bn2 )
f∗K(b
n
2 )
(3)
The second equality, again, comes from definitions in section 2. The numerator of the
second term on the right hand side is the probability that bn2 is the highest rejected
of a neighbourhood, or none. This would be ineﬃcient because we could only award contracts on the
basis of ‘aggregate neighbourhood bids’, rather than the ‘marginal bids’ of each individual within a
neighbourhood.
12
bid, which is strictly positive. Since the denominator is positive as well9, we can see
that the neighbourhood has an incentive to shade its bid for the second contract, i.e.
bn2 ≤ vn2 . Put another way, there is an incentive to demand excessive payment for the
second contract. The intuition is as follows. If bn2 were the highest rejected bid, n would
receive a payment of (−bn2 ). The more negative bn2 is, the larger would be the payment
in this event. Because the probability of this event is positive, the neighbourhood has an
incentive to shade its bid for the second contract. On the other hand, lowering the second
bid reduces the chances of n actually winning a second contract and receiving a total
payment of (−2c−nK−1). This tempers the neighbourhood’s incentive to shade its bid, but
the equilibrium strategy is still to bid below its valuation of the second contract. Clearly,
this complication does not arise for the first bid because a neighbourhood’s own first bid
never aﬀects how much it is paid if it wins. Completely solving the neighbourhood’s
optimisation problem yields the following equilibrium joint bidding strategy:
Theorem 1. A symmetric undominated Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the uniform-price
sealed bid auction with joint bidding is given by a set of continuous monotonic bidding
strategies B∗(vn1 , vn2 ) = (B∗1(vn1 ), B∗2(vn2 )), one for each neighbourhood n, such that
B∗1(v
n
1 ) = v
n
1 (4)
and
B∗2(v
n
2 ) =
 v if v
n
2 < T (v)
vn2 − T (vn2 ) otherwise
(5)
where
T (bn2 ) =
￿
X,Y ;2X+Y=2N−K−1R(b
n
2 )￿2N−2
t=2N−K
￿
X,Y ;2X+Y=t
￿
∂R
∂bn2
+ ∂R
∂B−1∗2
∂B−1∗2
∂bn2
￿ (6)
and
R(bn2 ) =
(N − 1)!
X!Y !(N −X − Y − 1)!
￿￿ B−1∗2 (bn2 )
v
￿ bn2
v
h(vm1 , v
m
2 )dv
m
1 dv
m
2
￿X
(7)
9A proof that f∗K(b
n
2 ) > 0 can be found in Noussair (1995).
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￿￿ B−1∗2 (bn2 )
v
￿ 0
bn2
h(vm1 , v
m
2 )dv
m
1 dv
m
2
￿Y ￿￿ 0
B−1∗2 (bn2 )
￿ 0
bn2
h(vm1 , v
m
2 )dv
m
1 dv
m
2
￿N−X−Y−1
and where
B∗2(0) = 0 if N < K
B∗2(v) = v otherwise
See Noussair (1995) for a proof of theorem 1.10 B−1∗2 in equation 6 is just the inverse
of the function B∗2 (we have dropped the n-superscript here to simplify notation, and
because all neighbourhoods follow the same strategy in equilibrium). R(bn2 ), defined in
equation 7, is the probability in equilibrium that X bidders, not including n, submit
two bids lower than or equal to bn2 , that Y bidders other than n submit exactly one bid
greater than bn2 , and that N −X − Y − 1 bidders other than n submit two bids above
bn2 . h(vm1 , vm2 ) in equation 7 is the joint density of the order statistics of neighbourhood
valuations of a randomly selected neighbourhood m, where m ￿= n.
Stage 1: Individual or Joint bidding?
Comparing the individual bidding strategy with the joint bidding strategy, we find that
the individual and the neighbourhood alike will submit a first bid equal to the valuation
of winning only one contract. However, the presence of externalities means that the
actual bids of a given individual will diﬀer between the two scenarios. If the external-
ity associated with that bidder is positive, so that vi + ei > vi, the neighbourhood’s
honest bid will exceed the individual’s. The neighbourhood will also take account of
the externality relevant to the second bid, so that we have vj + ej > vj for a positive
externality.
10Noussair (1995), considers a slightly diﬀerent formulation of the underlying problem than presented
here. Firstly, what we call neighbourhoods, Noussair imagines as inseparable entities, which means
that valuations do not have the structure of being sums of random variables. Secondly, he considers a
standard auction (i.e. valuations are positive), while we are considering a reverse auction (i.e. valuations
are negative). Thirdly, there is a zero-payoﬀ from loosing in Noussair’s auction, while in our problem
individuals still make a profit if they loose. Noussair’s result is presented here with these alterations,
but the form of the proof is unchanged.
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As noted above, in the joint bidding scenario a neighbourhood’s second bid might
end up the highest rejected bid, and therefore determines how much it is paid for the
first contract it wins. This creates an incentive to make excessive demands payment
for the second contract. The neighbourhood has to balance this against the consequent
reduced chances of winning the second contract. The result of this balancing act is
that vj + ej ≥ vj + ej − T (vj + ej). The net eﬀect of accounting for externalities
and shading the bid for the second contract, ej − T (vj + ej), can be either positive or
negative, corresponding to an increase or reduction in the second bid compared with j’s
individually optimal bid.
Switching from individual to joint bidding thus has two eﬀects on bidding behaviour.
Firstly, it induces individuals to consider the externalities they produce if they win.
Secondly, it prompts neighbourhoods to strategically exaggerate their second bids. If
all externalities are zero or negative, joint bidding will result in the auctioneer having
to make higher expected payments to secure a given amount of ecosystem services. But
as long as some portion of externalities are positive, it is unclear whether joint bidding
increases or decreases the payment per contract. If externalities are suﬃciently large,
they will outweigh the loss in competitive pressure, and permitting joint bidding would
then reduce the expected cost of achieving the conservation target. Such cost-savings
may be substantial, since, even if the payment per contract is only a little lower, the
cost-saving is multiplied by every sold conservation contract (recall that the total cost
to the auctioneer is K × (−p)).
Whether such cost-savings exist, and how large they are, depends on the size and
distribution of externalities, the distribution of individual valuations, the number of
individuals that participate, and the number of contracts that are auctioned (these terms
appear in theorem 1). If the policy maker has some idea of these, he can calculate the
expected cost of using individual and joint bidding, and compare them. To demonstrate
how to conduct such a calculation, let us simulate a simple example of the uniform-price
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auction.
A simple simulation
We fix the number of individuals (I = 4) and contracts (K = 3), and assume that, given
some y, individual valuations are independently and uniformly distributed on [ν, ν + 1],
and externalities are independently and uniformly distributed on [e, e + 1]. To satisfy
our assumptions that individual and neighbourhood valuations are non-positive, we let
ν ≤ −1 and ν+ e+2 = 0. We also assume that the size of externalities are independent
of scale of production. Since the sum of two independently and uniformly distributed
random variables follows a triangular distribution, neighbourhood valuations follow a
triangular distribution on [−2, 0], with mode −1. It is then possible to compute the
joint distribution of the order statistics of neighbourhood valuations, which is needed to
specify the joint bidding strategy.
We simulate the individual bidding scenario by independently drawing four values
from the uniform distribution on [ν, ν+1]. Since bids are equal to individual valuations,
the three bidders with the highest valuations will win one contract each, and each winner
will each receive a payment equal to negative of the highest rejected bid.
We simulate the joint bidding scenario by independently drawing two pairs of values
from the triangular distribution on [−2, 0] with mode −1. For each pair of neighbour-
hood valuations, we obtain the bids using the equilibrium bidding strategy B∗(vn1 , vn2 ) =
(B∗1(vn1 ), B∗2(vn2 )), where
B∗1(v
n
1 ) = v
n
1 (8)
and
oFigure 3: Plot of B∗2(vn2 ) in equation 9
B∗2(v
n
2 ) =

vn2 − 116
￿
(vn2 )2 + 4vn2 + 2
￿2 if − 2 ≤ vn2 ≤ −1￿
− 4(vn2+2)(vn2 )2+4vn2+2 −
√
2 log
￿−vn2 +√2− 2￿+√2 log ￿vn2 +√2 + 2￿￿
vn2 − 148vn2
￿
(vn2 )3
￿
4 + 3
√
2 log
￿√
2− 1￿− 3√2 log ￿1 +√2￿￿+ 16￿ if − 1 < vn2 ≤ 0
(9)
Equation 8 is just the same as equation 4, and equation 9 is the special case of
equation 5 for this particular auction. Equation 9 is derived in the appendix.
To help us visualise joint bidding strategy, figure 3 plots equations 8 and 9 over the
interval [−2, 0], and reads oﬀ the first and second bids (vertical axis) corresponding to
some neighbourhood valuations (horizontal axis). The neighbourhood bids honestly for
the first bid, as reflected by the 45◦ line. The neighbourhood shades its second bid, as
is apparent from the fact that the curve falls below the 45◦ line. Thus, as drawn in the
figure, although the neighbourhood only requires a payment of 1.3 to be indiﬀerent to
conservation, it will demand nearly 1.8 in equilibrium (exaggerating by nearly 40%).
The three individuals with the highest bids will be awarded one contract each and
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receive a payment equal to the negative value of the highest rejected bid.
For a given realisation of individual valuations and externalities, we can calculate
how much the auctioneer will end up paying per contract with individual and joint bid-
ding regimes. However, since the policy maker knows only the distribution of individual
valuations and externalities, it will only be able to figure out how much it will need to
pay in expectation. For repeated realisations of individual valuations and externalities,
we can approximate the distribution of payments. Figure 4 plots such approximations
of the probability density functions (pdfs) of p, obtained by repeating the auction one
million times.11 Panel (a) plots the pdf in the joint bidding scenario. The same dis-
tribution is obtained for any pair of intervals [ν, ν + 1] and [e, e + 1] that satisfy the
boundary restrictions. Panel (b) plots a family of pdfs for the individual bidding sce-
nario, as the interval over which individual valuations are distributed [ν, ν+1] is shifted
from [−1, 0 down to [−3,−2] in half-unit steps. Notice that because the distribution of
neighbourhood valuations is fixed, the interval over which externalities are distributed,
[e, e+ 1], must simultaneously shift up from [−1, 0] to [1, 2]. The downward shift of the
distribution of p in panel (b) can therefore be interpreted as a consequence of increasing
the proportion of neighbourhood valuations accounted for by externalities. As the size
of externalities increases, the expected payments obtained through joint bidding begins
to look more favourable by comparison.
It is a well-known result that the order statistics of independent and uniformly dis-
tributed random variables are Beta random variables. Using this fact, the expectation
of p would be E(p) = I−KI =
1
4 , were individual valuations to be distributed on [0, 1].
Since taking the expectation is a linear operation, the expectation of p is given by
E(p) =
1
4
+ ν (10)
when individual valuations are distributed on the interval [ν, ν + 1]. It is reassuring
that the curve given by equation 10 also emerges in our simulation as the envelope of
11Details of simulations are available from the author on request.
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Figure 4: Approximate distributions of the per contract payment. Panel (a) shows the
approximate pdf of the per contract payment in the uniform-price auction with joint
bidding. Panel (b) shows a corresponding family of pdfs of the per contract payment
obtained with individual bidding. The pdfs in panel (b) approximate the pdf of a beta
random variable.
the expected transfers as ν changes (see figure 5). The expectation of p in the joint
bidding scenario (panel (a) in figure 4) can be numerically approximated to −1.806. It
is then a matter of simple arithmetic to show that joint and individual bidding yield
approximately equal payments per contract in expectation when ν = −2.056. The point
(−1.806,−2.056) is located where the curve intersects the vertical axis in figure 5. At this
point, individual valuations are uniformly distributed on the interval [−2.056,−1.056],
and externalities on [0.056, 1.056]. Thus, individual and joint bidding result in the same
payments in expectation when the average size of externalities is approximately 30% of
the expected size of payments. When externalities are smaller (in the right quadrant of
figure 5), individual bidding results in lower payments in expectation. When externalities
are larger (to the right), joint bidding results in lower payments. Notice also that, since
the total cost of achieving the conservation target is K × (−p), the expected cost-saving
of using a joint bidding structure as we move to the right increases at 3 times the rate of
decline of the expected per contract payment. Thus, even if externalities are only slightly
larger than the critical level, there are potentially large cost-savings from allowing joint
bidding.
Suppose, then, that a policy maker was organising a uniform-price auction for four
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νE(p)
Figure 5: Envelope of approximate expected per contract payment
individuals, and y is chosen such that individual valuations and externalities are uni-
formly distributed on unit intervals. Having some prior belief about the size of external-
ity flows, this simulation will tell him whether he should opt for an individual or joint
bidding structure.
In our simulated special case, joint bidding will only be preferable when all external-
ities are positive. However, in principle joint bidding may reduce payments even when
some proportion of externalities are negative. This kind of simulation can be conducted
for any auction scenario, and will locate the point at which the balance tips in favour of
joint bidding.
Simulations can also locate tipping points with respect to the number of bidders, and
the number of contracts for sale, and with respect to changes in the characteristics of the
underlying distributions of individual valuations and externalities. Given information
about some of these variables, it is then possible to optimise the auction design with
respect to the remaining unknowns.12 This can help the policy maker select a more
cost-eﬃcient auction format for his PES scheme.
12Further information about simulations are available from the author on request.
20
4 Conclusion
Previous models of conservation auctions have looked at the behaviour of isolated vertices
on a plane—neighbour-less individuals—but it is both inappropriate and unnecessary to
ignore externalities between bidders. We can now connect these dots to form a crude
blueprint, and although we have not connected all the dots yet, we have suggested
a toolkit for doing so. In real life PES auctions, individuals may already be deviating
from isolated optmisation, and it is important that our theoretical framework be similarly
expanded to include joint bidding. This paper has introduced auction theory results not
normally considered in the context of PES auctions, and provided a neighbourhood
structure that allows us to reinterpret and make use of these theoretical results. We
have demonstrated that this toolkit can be operationalised, analysing the properties of
the uniform-price auction. The properties of the uniform-price auction in our simple
example hold for the ‘neighbourhood world’ in general, both existence of an equilibrium
(Reny, 1999; Bresky, 1999) and the systematic exaggeration of bids (Krishna, 2002).
This oﬀers a stronger starting position for the study of conservation auctions than the
traditional models of a ‘neighbour-less world’.
We have focused on the potential for using joint bidding to reduce costs, but the
underlying machinery allows us to ask further questions. How allocatively ineﬃcient
will individual and joint bidding be in the presence of externalities, and what does
allocative ineﬃciency depend on? Bresky (2009) suggests that the policy maker can use
the reservation price to reduce allocative ineﬃciency under a joint bidding regime. Thus,
a joint bidding regime with an appropriately set reservation price could reduce both the
public and private cost of conservation.
Additional questions have been raised with regard to the properties of auctions in
the presence of synergies. We can represent synergies in our framework by letting the
externality flow associated with the first winner in a neighbourhood to be zero, and
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subsequent externality flows reflect the synergies with previous winners in the neigh-
bourhood. If these synergies accrue to the policy maker instead of individuals, we can
still use this framework, but we would now need to condition payments on these added
benefits (see Banerjee et al. (2009) for a discussion of how to design an auction that con-
ditions payments in this way, and Sa¨ıd and Thoyer (2007) for an experimental study).
The framework presented here is flexible enough to include all of these possibilities.
Externalities are recognised to be important in conservation auctions. In fact, despite
the apparent lack of a theoretical framework to evaluate joint bidding, in 2004-5, the
Australian Auction for Landscape Recovery actually allowed joint bidding. In the future,
such pilot projects can be more systematically evaluated with the aid of the framework
presented here.
An important objective for future research will be to investigate bidding behaviour
under alternative conditions, and to extend the simulations presented here. In par-
ticular, this will involve extending this analysis to other auction formats, such as the
pay-your-bid auction (Chakraborty, 2006), and to incorporate more sophisticated mod-
els of coalition formation. These endeavours must be complemented with measurements
of externality flows taken in the field and through interviews, to guide theoretical work
towards empirically interesting scenarios, and with experimental work, to evaluate new
predictions about conservation auctions.
Appendix: Deriving equation 9
The Bapat-Beg theorem (Bapat and Beg, 1989) gives the joint cumulative distribution
of order statistics. The joint cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the order statistics
of two i.i.d random variables is given by
H(vn1 , v
n
2 ) = Prob(max(v
in, vjn) ≤ vn1 ,min(vin, vjn) ≤ vn2 )
= 2G(vn1 )G(v
n
2 )− (G(vn2 ))2
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where vn1 > vn2 (otherwise the density h of H is zero). G is the cdf of neighbourhood
valuations. The probability that, for a randomly selected neighbourhood m (where
m ￿= n), both bids are below or equal to bn2 is
Prob(bm1 ≤ bn2 , bm2 ≤ bn2 ) =
￿ B−1∗2 (bn2 )
v
￿ bn2
v
h(vm1 , v
m
2 )dv
m
1 dv
m
2
=
￿ bn2
−2
￿ bn2
−2
h(vm1 , v
m
2 )dv
m
1 dv
m
2
= H(bn2 , b
n
2 )
= 2G(bn2 )G(b
n
2 )− (G(bn2 ))2
= (G(bn2 ))
2
Neighbourhood valuations are distributed on [−2, 0]2, so it is straightforward to replace
v with −2 above. Moreover, h = 0 always where B−1∗2 (bn2 ) > bn2 , so we can replace
B−1∗2 (bn2 ) with bn2 without altering the value of the integral, thus obtaining the second
equality.
By a similar argument, the probability that both of bids are greater than bn2 is
Prob(bm1 > b
n
2 , b
m
2 > b
n
2 ) =
￿ 0
B−1∗2 (bn2 )
￿ 0
bn2
h(vm1 , v
m
2 )dv
m
1 dv
m
2
=
￿ 0
B−1∗2 (bn2 )
￿ 0
B−1∗2 (bn2 )
h(vm1 , v
m
2 )dv
m
1 dv
m
2
= H(0, 0)−H(0, B−1∗2 (bn2 ))−H(B−1∗2 (bn2 ), 0) +H(B−1∗2 (bn2 ), B−1∗2 (bn2 ))
= H(0, 0)−H(0, B−1∗2 (bn2 ))−H(B−1∗2 (bn2 ), B−1∗2 (bn2 )) +H(B−1∗2 (bn2 ), B−1∗2 (bn2 ))
= H(0, 0)−H(0, B−1∗2 (bn2 ))
= 1−H(0, B−1∗2 (bn2 ))
= 1− 2G(0)G(B−1∗2 (bn2 ))− (G(B−1∗2 (bn2 )))2
= (1−G(B−1∗2 (bn2 )))2
The probability that m submits exactly one bid that is greater than bn2 is
Prob(bm1 > b
n
2 , b
m
2 ≤ bn2 ) =
￿ B−1∗2 (bn2 )
v
￿ 0
bn2
h(vm1 , v
m
2 )dv
m
1 dv
m
2
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= H(0, B−1∗2 (b
n
2 ))−H(bn2 , V ∗2 (bn2 ))
= H(0, V −1∗2 (b
n
2 ))−H(bn2 , bn2 )
= 2G(B−1∗2 (b
n
2 ))− (G(B−1∗2 (bn2 )))2 − (G(bn2 ))2
Then, the probability that X bidders other than n submit two bids lower than or equal
to bn2 , that Y bidders other than n submit exactly one bid greater than bn2 , and that
N −X − Y − 1 bidders other than n submit two bids above bn2 is
R(bn2 ) =
(N − 1)!
X!Y !(N −X − Y − 1)!
￿
(G(bn2 ))
2
￿X ￿2G(B−1∗2 (bn2 ))− (G(B−1∗2 (bn2 )))2 − (G(bn2 ))2￿Y￿
(1−G(B−1∗2 (bn2 ))2
￿N−X−Y−1
Assuming that N = 2, the multinomial coeﬃcient equals 1. We then want to calculate
the numerator and denominator of the second term on the right hand side of the equation
B∗2(v
n
2 ) = v
n
2 −
￿
X,Y ;2X+Y=2N−K−1R(b
n
2 )￿2N−2
t=2N−K
￿
X,Y ;2X+Y=t
￿
∂R
∂bn2
+ ∂R
∂B−1∗2
∂B−1∗2
∂bn2
￿
Let us first consider the numerator. Assuming that K = 3 and N = 2, there is only one
possible combination of values for X and Y , namely (X,Y ) = (0, 0). We can then write￿
X,Y ;2X+Y=2N−K−1
R(bn2 ) = (1−G(B−1∗2 (bn2 )))2
In the denominator, t goes from 1 to 2, so only (X,Y ) = (0, 1) or (1, 0) are possible. We
can therefore write the denominator as
2N−2￿
t=2N−K
￿
X,Y ;2X+Y=t
￿
∂R
∂bn2
+
∂R
∂B−1∗2
∂B−1∗2
∂bn2
￿
=
∂
∂bn2
￿
2G(B−1∗2 (b
n
2 ))− (G(B−1∗2 (bn2 )))2
￿
Putting these expressions together and simplifying gives
B∗2(v
n
2 ) = v
n
2 − (1−G(vn2 ))2
￿ vn2
−2
1
(1−G(x))2dx (11)
with initial condition B∗2(0) = 0, since N < K. In our case, G is the cdf of the triangular
distribution on the interval [−2, 0] with mode −1. We can write it in the form
G(x) =
 x− sign(x+ 1)
(x+1)2
2 +
3
2 if − 2 ≤ x ≤ 0
0 otherwise
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Since the integrand on the right hand side of equation 11 is a piecewise rational function,
it is possible to retrieve the anti-derivative. It is then a matter of arithmetic manipulation
to obtain equation 9, restated below
B∗2(v
n
2 ) =

vn2 − 116
￿
(vn2 )2 + 4vn2 + 2
￿2 if − 2 ≤ vn2 ≤ −1￿
− 4(vn2+2)(vn2 )2+4vn2+2 −
√
2 log
￿−vn2 +√2− 2￿+√2 log ￿vn2 +√2 + 2￿￿
vn2 − 148vn2
￿
(vn2 )3
￿
4 + 3
√
2 log
￿√
2− 1￿− 3√2 log ￿1 +√2￿￿+ 16￿ if − 1 < vn2 ≤ 0
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